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Abstract
This paper deals with the process of incorporation of “infotainment” in the Russian television 
industry. Professional journalism is analyzed as a tool for the interpretation of facts, which 
have contributed to erode the myths of mass consciousness, which were formed by Soviet 
propaganda. According to the author, television news and other infotainment programs have 
affected socio-cultural processes in Russia; in particular, they have contributed to shaping 
the worldview of post-Soviet intellectuals, known as the “new intelligentsia”.
Resumen
Este artículo trata principalmente el proceso de incorporación del “infoentretenimiento” en 
la industria televisiva rusa. El periodismo profesional se considera como  un medio para la 
interpretación de los hechos que ha contribuido a erosionar los mitos de la conciencia de 
masas configurados por la propaganda soviética. Según la hipótesis defendida por la autora, 
las noticias de televisión y otros programas de infoentretenimiento han influido notablemente 
en procesos socio-culturales en Rusia, en concreto, en la formación de la visión del mundo de 
los intelectuales post-soviéticos, también llamados la “nueva intelectualidad”.
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]1.  Stating the problem
Since the Perestroika era, Russian liberal intellectuals have 
contributed to the media as journalists or experts, and have been seen 
as “the active public” (Khrenov, 2007) of authoritative resources (which in 
different years included Ogoniok magazine, the  Kommersant newspaper, the 
radio station Echo of Moscow, the television channel NTV, and the RIA Novosti 
news agency, among others). Their critical attitude towards the authorities 
did not prevent the majority from voting for the President and Parliament in 
accordance with the plans of Vladimir Putin’s political team. However, it did 
create a atmosphere of debate, which until recently did not interfere with the 
elite’s power 
It was in 2012, before the parliamentary elections, when everything 
began to change. At the time, the residents of big cities, above all, Moscow, 
dissatisfied with voting results, participated in demonstrations. A few months 
later, in the spring of 2013, the protests resumed due to the election of 
Vladimir Putin as president, and then again in the spring of 2014 in response 
to the appearance of Russian armed forces in Ukraine, as well as the 
annexation of Crimea. In this context, the leading media’s editorial boards 
underwent a process of transformation. The ownership of many media outlets 
regarded as liberal, like Kommersant, RIA Novosti, and the Lenta.ru website, 
changed hands, leading to the dismissal of senior managerial staff. Even at 
the media institutions that avoided firing notable employees, editorial policy 
has changed, there is now an increasingly positive and detailed coverage 
of the authorities’ actions, Russian national interests are highlighted, and 
foreigners are represented as enemies.
These late changes have destroyed the ideology that had been 
developed by liberal media for the past  25 years. The ideology which came 
to be called “Western” in Russia is a specific Russian hybrid of notions 
and images from European culture of the 19th and 20th centuries, from the 
Enlightenment to the culture of mass consumption. “In the eyes of Russian 
intellects, these ideas are considered through the concept of cosmopolitanism” 
(Beck, 2006).
In its current form, the social group of Russian intellectuals sharing 
liberal “Western” values appeared after the dissolution of the USSR. The style 
of journalism which can be related to this group, labeled as “infotainment”, 
plays an important role in disseminating their ideas. In the author’s opinion, 
since the 1990s, this “infotainment” has contributed to Russian television 
overthrowing old myths and shaping new ones in their stead.
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2.  Theoretical and methodological basis
The term “infotainment” (Postman, 1985), created by merging the words 
“information” and “entertainment”, has been used in the USA since 1980s to refer 
to an approach in news presentation (Thussu, 2007) which allowed journalists 
to abandon official accounts and thoroughly considered comments in favor of 
“unofficial” communication and amusing details. 
The appearance of infotainment in Russia is connected with the transition 
from the Soviet model of state-owned television to the American commercial 
model, all occurring after the dissolution of the USSR. Russian TV then had to 
face many problems which are familiar to European media researchers (Francia, 
1998/99; Menduni, 1998), whose work, among others’, forms a part of this 
research’s theoretical foundation. However, the transformations of Russian TV in 
this period have particular features. Apart from the technological, economic, and 
cultural transformations, Russian mass-media also faced an ideology crisis. A 
commercialized model of TV broadcasting contradicted both communist and socialist 
ideals as well as the educational ideals of traditional Russian intellectuals.
The author’s hypothesis holds the following: during the 20 years from the 
mid-1990s to 2010s, infotainment developed in Russia not only as a commercially 
successful news format, but also as a special language; a tool used by new 
Russian intellectuals in order to update the social myths that Russian culture had 
been imbued with since the 19th century. 
In Russia, an ironic attitude (Boym, 2002) towards the past and the 
official culture connected with communist ideology has become the main device 
of such communication. By using irony, infotainment in Russia has not only made 
news attractive for the mass audience, but also helped to desacralize (that is, to 
destroy) Soviet myths. 
The author’s analysis of TV infotainment is based on the research of 
Linda Hutcheon (Hutcheon, 1998) and Katerina Clark (Clark, 1981), who singled 
out the story about the formation of a positive character as the basic narrative 
model of Soviet culture, and on Alexander Prokhorov’s (Prokhorov, 2007) study of 
the literature and cinema of the Thaw, where Soviet art is examined in terms of 
dealing with three major tropes: the trope of a hero; the trope of war; and the trope 
of a big family.
Russian infotainment, in the author’s opinion, uses the same tropes but 
presents them in a dialogical fashion. It is important to note Bakhtin’s speculation 
about serious genres, like traditional news, as “monologic”, dictating an integral 
and unchanging discourse about the world, while seriocomic genres, such as 
infotainment, are “dialogic” (Bakhtin, 1963).
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]In some cases, this was achieved by means of combining Soviet 
discourse and/or the discourse of intellectuals with postmodern ridicule of 
these discourses within the same news reports, and in others by means 
of storytelling, which allows to demonstrate how old Soviet myths are 
modernized using the example of ordinary people’s life stories.  
A discourse analysis of TV reports was used to determine the 
elements of myth that are responsible for the dialogical nature of discourse. 
This study also involved an analysis of the most significant projects of the NTV 
created using the method of infotainment. This choice has been determined 
by the specific role of the NTV in the late 1990s and 2010s. For several 
decades, it has been ranked among the three channels with the highest 
ratings. Despite the corporate conflicts of the late 1990s and the channel’s 
rebranding, as well as the resignation of a number of professionals, for a 
longer time than other Russian channels it retained its orientation towards 
liberal ideas, and American and European cultures, in addition to helping to 
shape the image of Russia’s modernized future. A documentary series by 
journalists Leonid Parfionov and Alexey Pivovarov, together with the NTV’s 
end-of-the-day news broadcasts from 2010-2011, provided the main material 
for the author’s analysis.
3.  Results of the research
According to the type of analysis carried out, the reports were 
divided into two categories: those making sense of the myth about the past 
and those creating a myth about the future. The reports in which journalists 
were engaged in an ironical dialog with the past fell into the first category. 
The second type of reports involved storytelling about the people who live in 
accordance with the laws of this mythical future. 
The socio-cultural crisis resulting from the dissolution of the USSR was 
at first perceived by intellectuals as a chance to acquire cultural domination. 
Some of them even made an attempt to join the power elite in building a 
capitalist society. Others, on the contrary, chose to preserve the ideas of the 
socialist state. With a considerable delay in the Russian political sphere, the 
division into “right” and “left” took shape.
However, the younger generation of intellectuals born in the USSR and 
brought up in the period of Brezhnev’s “modernization”(Makarkin, 2011) were 
oriented not as  much towards the cultural experience of Soviet intellectuals 
as towards the global culture of consumption, which was perceived as a 
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manifestation of freedom. The USA became a reference point for them, and 
infotainment became the language of a media myth about the future.
With regard to the term “intellectual”, which does not have a common 
definition in Russian social sciences, the interpretation of Konstantin Sokolov 
(Sokolov, 2007) will be used here. According to him, Russian intellectuals should 
be regarded as a heterogeneous social group, which comprises several concentric 
circles. To the “core” belong the few “ideologists” – the cultural elite creating 
mythologemes, forced to establish certain relations with the authorities, who search 
for consultants capable of influencing public opinion. The middle layer consists of 
“propagandists” – sociologists, historians, philosophers, journalists, and bohemians 
– who process these ideologemes into myths and pass them on to society with the 
help of the contemporary media. The periphery is formed by “executors” – doctors, 
teachers, lawyers, and engineers – who rank themselves among this subculture 
guided by social myths transmitted by TV. 
Moving forward, we regard infotainment as a creation tool for a specific 
discourse and myths by means of which “propagandist” intellectuals communicate 
with “executor” intellectuals. 
The main social myth addressed in this work is that about the uniqueness 
of Russian intellectuals and their specific cultural mission, which distinguishes 
them from their European counterparts. This myth already started to take shape 
in the 19th century and has undertaken some shifts in Soviet culture throughout 
the 20th century. The media, starting with magazines and newspapers, followed by 
films, radio, and TV, played an active role in this process. Therefore, by the 1970s, 
marked by social stagnation in the USSR and the development of the ideology of 
consumption, the public’s ideas about intellectuals had already been completely 
mythologized; a fact of reality (Barthes, 1970) gave way to ideas about it that were 
largely shaped by the film industry (Prokhorov, 2007). During this period, the values 
of the cosmopolitan intellectuals oriented towards the cultural standards of the 
Euro-Atlantic world and those of their traditionalist counterparts were not mutually 
opposed, but rather provided the dialogical nature of the culture. This was due to the 
fact that being an intellectual in the USSR was a peculiar form of protest against the 
idea of universal equality, both cultural and socioeconomic, which was degenerating 
into mediocrity. In these conditions, both cosmopolitanism and traditionalism 
worked equally well to distinguish oneself from the crowd.
3.1. Infotainment as a tool of desacralization of Soviet myths 
The system of Soviet myths included both social myths about the past, 
like the triumph of the Revolution or victory in World War II, and social myths 
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]about the future, like the victory of technical progress or of communism worldwide 
(Wright, 2005). By the end of the 1980s, the majority of these myths failed to 
inspire Russian society. By the early 1990s, all the myths were about the past even 
though people continued to see themselves as the heirs of Soviet culture, longing 
for it in a nostalgic way. Between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, infotainment in 
Russia was used to ridicule Soviet myths, stereotypes, and models of behavior.
One of the most popular authors and presenters of TV programs during 
this period was the journalist Leonid Parfionov (NTV), who presented the weekly 
news show “The Other Day” and the historical program “The Other Day. Our Era”, 
where he played with the official discourse of Soviet state leaders by superimposing 
his own image on archival photos so as to appear to be participating in the events 
himself. Both programs combined irony towards the Soviet past with nostalgia 
for it. Infotainment allowed the presentation of serious political, economic, and 
historical information through storytelling to be easily accessible for a mass 
audience. It attracted the viewers by means of scandalous, shocking, and criminal 
details of the past and the present. 
In fact, not only the political myths of the Soviet era were subject to 
infotainment’s ironical laughter, but also cultural myths, particularly tailored to 
intellectuals-educators of the past. For instance, TV serials “Live Pushkin” (NTV, 
1999) and “Gogol-Bird” (1 channel, 2009) desacralize the myths about great 
Russian writers. Their literary achievements were represented as a result of their 
tumultuous private lives or a consequence of mental illness. The mass audience, 
attracted by tabloid-like details, was intrigued and indignant at the same time. 
“Old school” intellectuals turned off their TVs in resentment. Neither group of 
viewers could understand the game contrived by the series’ authors. They were 
trying to show that the life and work of writers considered “literary classics” was 
more complicated and contradictory than it is taught in schools. In losing their 
sacredness, these writers become modern heroes free from Soviet ideological 
one-dimensionality.
The meaning of this game lay not in overthrowing the literary authority of 
Pushkin and Gogol but in giving the viewer an intellectual and emotional shaking, 
in purifying the discourse about culture from stock phrases and perceptional 
stereotypes. By emphasizing the eccentricities and pranks of these geniuses, 
the authors of these films represent great writers for the viewers as “their own 
people”. “And yet I wish I could drop in “The Yar” [name of a restaurant] for dinner 
together with Alexander Sergeich [Pushkin] if only for a quarter of an hour,” sang 
Bulat Okudzhava, an exponent of the spirit of Soviet intellectuals. Leonid Parfionov, 
the author of the above-mentioned films, eliminates the distance between himself, 
his audience, and the geniuses of the past. He can go dining with writers and he 
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actually does it with his signature technique – injecting himself as a documentary 
character into staged episodes of the film. The overthrown myth about a positive 
Soviet character is replaced by a myth about a new hero, who is cosmopolitan not 
only in geographic terms but also in those of historical time.
Such cultural provocation forms part of the dialog (Bakhtin, 1963) 
between propagandist intellectuals (journalists) and executive intellectuals 
(the enlightened public), the aim of which is to prevent the latter’s worldview 
from stabilizing. By returning the spirit of counter-culture to Pushkin and Gogol 
and searching in revolts of the past for features akin to the present, Parfionov 
and his followers educate the viewers no better than intellectuals of the past. 
He does not, however, take a moral stand which appears to scare the 21st 
century commoner who is afraid of exhibiting bourgeois traits.
This fear, in the author’s opinion, has penetrated into Russia 
together with contemporary western culture shaped at the meeting-point of 
bourgeois culture, with its traditional values and counterculture, which has 
been overthrowing traditions since the mid-20th century. Before the revolution 
of 1917, Russian culture did not have time to become bourgeois. Later on, the 
bourgeois attitudes and lifestyle of the party elite of the 1970-80s started to 
influence various strata of society. In those years, intellectuals attempted to 
oppose this process as counterculture. However, the political and economic 
cataclysms of the late 1980s and 1990s prevented both the establishment 
of bourgeoisie and the formation of counterculture from being completed. 
Bourgeois attitudes continue to be viewed by Russian intellectuals as a 
rejection of the idea of serving the people, which is still a meaningful part of 
the myth about a positive character.
Another basic Soviet narrative which laid the foundation of social 
mythology is the war myth. It has also undergone a desacralization process 
starting from the mid-1990s. On different channels, films were created using 
20th-century newsreels, episodes from feature films, and including interviews 
with experts from various fields, as well as eyewitnesses. Their aim was to 
revise the Soviet version of 20th century history. During the first stage, it was 
neither a game nor a kind of entertainment. It was a manifestation of glasnost 
which accompanied the perestroika processes.
By the early 2000s, most of the terrifying facts of 20thcentury history 
had already been communicated to the public, but this did not destroy the 
Soviet myths about war and victory – neither the Civil War nor World War II. 
The mass consciousness continued to sacralize Stalin as the victor in the 
war against fascism, and the USSR as the savior of the world. Yearly public 
debates, held just before 9 May, confirm this. 
selecta
INfotaINmENt oN RuSSIaN tV 237
E
-
I
S
S
N
:
 
2
1
7
3
-
1
0
7
1
 
 
IC
 –
 R
ev
is
ta
 C
ie
nt
ífi
ca
 d
e 
In
fo
rm
ac
ió
n 
y 
C
om
un
ic
ac
ió
n 
11
 (2
01
4)
 [p
p.
 2
29
-2
44
]A TV series of docudramas about the major battles of the Great Patriotic 
War (“Rzhev. An unknown battle of Georgy Zhukov” [NTV, 2009], “Moscow. 
Autumn of 1941” [NTV, 2009], “Brest. The bonded heroes” [NTV, 2010], among 
others) represented an interesting attempt at breaking stereotypes with the help 
of infotainment. The journalist Alexey Pivovarov who travels to the battlefields 
becomes the main character of these films. It is through his eyes that the audience 
is allowed to view the present and the past. Reconstructing the past by means 
of docudrama, the directors of these films investigate the events that war myths 
are based on. Military leaders and common soldiers played by actors argue with 
the heroes of Soviet films about war and dispute official memoirs, showing that 
life during the war was hard and that a discourse describing it should be dialogic 
and allow for irony, necessary for contemporary postmodern consciousness even 
in tragic historical episodes. In the authors’ opinion, cultural modernization is 
impossible without this dialog with the past. Precisely this is the main task of the 
“new intellectuals”, and infotainment serves this goal.
3.2. Infotainment as a tool for shaping the myth about the future
In the 2000s, wishing to be in keeping with the zeitgeist, while 
shaping its aims and values, the educated class in Russia had nothing to rely 
on but the tradition of Soviet intellectuals with their belief in progress and 
the bright future promised to them. To this end, each individual or community 
added elements of Western bourgeois culture or various forms of homebred 
traditionalism at their own pleasure, as well as various details from niche 
cultures (from yoga to Orthodox Christianity, from rock to folk music). The 
point was that it should be unobtrusive and without bombast, with a tinge of 
self-irony and playfulness. Infotainment, encompasses nowadays not only TV 
but also many other forms of cultural education – from museum exhibitions, 
concerts and theatre performances to public lectures and educational 
programs – and has become a convenient way of representing the cultural 
elite’s worldviews, shaping new ideology and new myths, and transmitting 
these to “executive intellectuals” in such forms that will not be rejected by 
contemporary consciousness as obtrusive and one-dimensional. Infotainment 
in present-day Russia is not a set of techniques but a style in which one part 
of society represents its notions of the future.
 As an alternative to the heroes of the past, television has provided 
a new myth about heroes of the future, which deals with individual economic 
success. For example, in one of the episodes of “The Other Day” on NTV 
channel, entitled “Exodus Reversed” (released on 21.04.2002) the viewers were 
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offered a new form of internationalism based on business values. According 
to this model, belonging to a certain social group is related to the desire 
to make money. 
In this case, there are “a Jew and a Chinaman”. Interestingly, the 
calculating Jew – a traditional character of Russian anecdotes – turns out to 
be a positive hero. He gives up his sacred dream about emigration to Israel 
(the title of the series refers to the biblical Exodus of the Jews from Egypt in 
search of the Promised Land) in favor of opening a successful enterprise doing 
business with China.
The account was full of associations and allusions, from historical 
(a reference to the first Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin) to political (a bull was 
called after the unpopular financial minister Chubais), through religious ones. 
Experiments with form, emphasis on personification, special effects, the use of 
drawn images, and animation were not an end in itself, but a means of engaging 
the viewers in a game, their involvement in which allowed them to feel as if they 
belonged to a circle of the elect few, who were able to understand all the meanings 
and connotations of a message. Infotainment’s irony allowed the viewer to soar 
above the mundane, having abandoned habitual clichés, playing with meanings 
and associations with the help of cutting and shaping a new discourse from the 
scraps of the old discourse of the intellectuals.
A crucial element of the Soviet intellectuals’ discourse is the progress myth 
(Lotman, 1999). In the 1990s, infotainment on TV was mainly directed at social and 
political progress and myths regarding them. Later on, political infotainment lost its 
elitism. Information programs on different channels contained plenty of fragments 
from films and videos, metaphoric details and minutiae, while journalism adopted 
paraphrases, allusions, and puns. All this was done, however, not in order to escape 
from Soviet myths but simply to hold the viewers’ attention.
In the 2000s, the myth about scientific and technological progress 
became an important part of modernizing myths, and infotainment took on the 
characteristics of sciencetainment, grounded on a series of attractions showing 
how technical progress can change everyday life. The progress myth forms part of 
the war narrative. In this case, it is a war not against a political enemy but rather 
against nature, tradition, and often human passivity. 
The film “Life in a Day” authored by thousands of directors – YouTube 
users (24.07.2010, “Today”, NTV www.ntv.ru/novosti/199699/) is a good example 
of this. In a short report, the journalist manages to raise several important issues, 
each of which is worthy of scholarly research. Among other topics, it discusses 
the influence of social media on the “extension of public space” and mundane 
practices being transformed into art.
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]The report’s prime mover, the director Kevin Macdonald, says the 
following about his project: “It isn’t a film, it’s a poem. The tiny videos on YouTube 
can be read as a chronicle of this planet, which is being written every minute.”
The journalist’s walk through the city together with the director, a 
traditional infotainment device, can also be perceived as part of the would-be film. 
The director asks the participants of the project three simple questions: What 
do you love? What do you fear? What can make you laugh? The journalist asked 
people in the street the same questions, but the majority of them refused to 
answer. The journalist’s behavior serves as an example of a progressive person’s 
response: he shows the viewers how he brushes his teeth in the bathroom, makes 
coffee, or rides in a taxi. In fact, this report is also a myth about the making of 
a positive character, or rather a multitude of characters who are sending in their 
footage for the film. Their readiness to extend the public space will earn them 
fame: “The film will be shown at a festival in America in January, and afterwards 
will appear on YouTube. Authors of the 20 most outstanding videos will receive 
personal invitations to the festival in Utah.”
Infotainment techniques, such as clip cutting in this case, are needed 
to remove conservative viewers’ fear of new technologies by means of a game, to 
help them develop an interest in the ideas of progress. The journalist, acting in 
keeping with the model suggested by Roland Barthes (Barthes, 1970), idealizes 
a new form (here, a new principle of film-making), understanding it as a way of 
creating a desirable future. By following the path of a “new creator” and making 
a film about himself, the author fills his account not with the facts of reality but 
with wishful thinking.
Here we see both a new myth about a positive character and a new myth 
about a war against a person’s fears in the face of the new information-oriented 
reality. There is even a new version of the “big family” myth. This family, though, 
is no longer the Soviet people as it was in the art of Socialist Realism (Prokhorov, 
2007), but a community of social network users.
The “big family” myth should be given special consideration. Whereas 
myths about a positive character and about war in post-Soviet culture found some 
kind of replacement rather soon, the “big Soviet family” myth was difficult to adapt 
to the new culture. Paternalism, which lays the foundation of the myth about 
the Soviet family, contradicted the values of individual success and personal 
responsibility, the intellectuals’ perception of the people as their “younger 
brother[s],” and the new ideas about the culture of “individual worlds.”
One of the ways this myth was transformed lies in the religious pursuits of 
post-Soviet culture. The positive character was thus found in the person of a priest, 
his war was the war against the sinful world order, and his congregation became his 
Anna A. Novikova240
IC
 – R
evista C
ientífica de Inform
ación y C
om
unicación 11 (2014) [pp. 229-244] 
E
-
I
S
S
N
:
 
2
1
7
3
-
1
0
7
1
big family. This version was in keeping with the ideas of 19th-century intellectuals, 
who felt their position to be close to that of priesthood (Lotman, 1999).
An example of such a story can be found in an account about a 
Polish priest who listened to the confessions of prostitutes not in a church but 
directly on the highway (NTV, 08.01.2011. “Today”, 19.12 http://www.ntv.ru/
novosti/216135/). The theme itself –the salvation of fallen women– is traditional 
in the culture of the Enlightenment. However, according to the Russian tradition, 
a priest must wear the soutane and behave in a reserved way, he can only meet 
criminals and prostitutes at church, where, having repented, they come to pray for 
forgiveness of their sins. The behavior of the character of the report breaks these 
stereotypes:
Polish priest Marek Poryzala, hiding his soutane under a leather 
jacket, is once again heading for the highway in search of women 
of easy virtue. Preaching, hearing confessions, giving a lift to 
those who [have] lost their way, Father Marek is ready to risk his 
life and engage in a conflict with pimps.
This footage surely seems scandalous: a Catholic priest leaves 
the highway, drives towards a girl on the side of the road and 
invites her to get into his car. Suspicions deepen as one 
examines the driver closely. He looks like a typical truck driver, 
an aficionado of booze and easy women. But judging from the 
conversation, it is not her body that the prostitute lays bare in 
his car, but her soul.
Prostitutes’ stories told by the priest also refute popular opinions. They 
turn out not to be sinful monsters but victims of circumstances: they miss their 
children left in their home towns, cannot bring themselves to tell their husbands 
about how they earn money for their family. The hero of the report confirms this 
observation both as a priest and as a researcher:
Marek Poryzala, priest: “I offer rosaries to these girls, and they always 
choose the white ones. This means that deep inside they long for purity and 
innocence.”
I needed to collect material for a book, so I got into my car and 
drove to the highway nearest to the church. At first, I was afraid; 
then the girls got used to me. I finished the book, but it would 
have been dishonorable to leave them then, as if I had exploited 
them like everyone else.
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]The character’s extraordinariness is highlighted by off-screen commentary, 
interview fragments, and details of visual narrative.
Off-screen commentary: 
The car is both a mobile church and a food store. Here’s only 
a part of its contents. The curate asked us not to show his 
number plate. Polish pimps hate him, once they chased him 
in two cars, he barely escaped. His goal is at least to show 
prostitutes that somebody cares for them; two of his protégées 
have already promised him to give up this trade.
Marek Poryzala, priest: “Here is my biretta, here are sandwiches for the 
girls – monks made them. And here is my garb and cross. If a prostitute wants to 
confess, I put them on and hear confession right here on the roadside. I also bring 
water for exorcism and salt for the same purpose.”
Having brought the problem out into the open and illustrated it with a 
vivid example, the journalist draws a conclusion which is typical of the discourse 
of intellectuals: he shows the hero as someone who stands up against the 
authorities, specifically to European rules, which is not conducive to revealing 
the problem, as this off-screen commentary shows: “European legislation forbids 
Polish authorities to collect statistics on prostitutes, that’s why it is unknown how 
many of them there are in the country. Euro-2012 will turn Poland and Ukraine into 
a world center of prostitution.”
When a sermon is not enough, and legal or social help is required, Father 
Marek sends women to La Strada Foundation that fights against human trafficking. 
Phone operators receive calls from female victims seven days a week. A La Strada 
Foundation employee stated “Every Wednesday we consult in Russian. Nearly half 
of the appeals for help come from women from Belarus and Ukraine. Russia is 
mainly represented by those from the Kaliningrad Oblast.”
At first sight, this exciting report (however traditional it may seem) should 
not be regarded as infotainment. However the character’s unusualness, the fact 
that prostitution is a taboo subject, the opportunity to peep “behind the scenes” 
of a priest’s work with his congregation, details of his everyday life, water and 
salt for exorcism (elements of the sacred, next to sandwiches for the women), 
attributes of the profane, car chases from the world of feature films – all this in 
one account becomes a part of a postmodernist game destroying stereotypes and 
not imposing a single correct conclusion.
Intertwining sacred motives and profane details, the journalist in this 
report, in the author’s opinion, follows the scheme of desacralisation of a myth 
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described by Mircea Eliade. Instead of the sacrament of confession or at least 
a confirmation of a sacred image of a priest sacrificing himself for his flock, the 
journalist offers viewers an example of the path of a “positive character” of the 
new type. It is the shift from the role of a researcher and writer to the role of a 
stereotype destroyer who activates the civic, if not political, energy of the audience 
for a fight for new images of the future. These images are constructed on the 
same mythological basis as the Soviet myths about a positive character, war, and 
a big family. However, the positive character is a Catholic priest who is at war 
neither with military opponents nor with the forces of nature, but with ideological 
enemies – officials and pimps. Whereas for prostitutes he positions himself as 
the father of a “big family,” ready to protect them from the unfair world order for 
the sake of their passage to a better future.
This variant of the myth is a sideshow for the modern secularized 
consciousness. Salvation through religion for an educated Russian spectator is a 
reference to the 19th century, to Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s “Crime and Punishment”, 
rather than a part of an image of the future. The loss of the big family myth 
would instead be compensated by social communication through the Internet. 
Web communities collecting money for costly operations, dispensing advice about 
upbringing children, discussing cultural and political events form “big families” 
around “paterfamilias” – bloggers who have over a thousand subscribers and, 
thus, the power to moderate the communication processes and shape cultural 
trends. In the author’s opinion, these bloggers use infotainment techniques, too. 
Regrettably, this is a topic for another research.
4.  Conclusions
The analysis of Russian TV news and documentaries that have been 
created with infotainment methods has allowed the author to suggest a typology 
of social myths that appear most relevant for post-Soviet culture. Some of them 
concern Russia’s past, while others deal with its image of the future. 
The narrative structure of infotainment reports on Russian TV is most 
often based on traditional myths of Soviet culture: about a “positive character”, 
war, “progress”, and the “big family.” Their old interpretation is desacralized by 
means of infotainment’s ironic devices, while the new one is constructed with 
the help of the same devices but without sacredness, on the basis of seriocomic 
dialogism.
For Russian intellectuals who came to work for TV after the Perestroika 
era, the method of infotainment became not only a means of attracting mass 
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]audiences and increasing the commercial value of the news but also presenting life 
stories in a seriocomic form. Infotainment journalists help their viewers to develop 
a dialogic worldview, preventing their ideas about the world from stabilizing. In 
this way, infotainment maintains a state of reflexivity – the features distinguishing 
intellectuals since the existence of this stratum.
The intensiveness of the dialogue around a type of social myth described 
here has changed according to the political situation in Russia. Thus, at the 
beginning of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency (2008), the myth “about progress” 
gained particular urgency, as it was used for the media promotion of the Skolkovo 
Naukograd project; whereas the World War II anniversaries actualized “the war 
myth” from 2009-2010. The popularity of the infotainment method among Russian 
TV journalists has decreased considerably since 2010. Dialogism in Russian 
journalism (above all seriocomic dialogism) has come to be perceived as politically 
incorrect. Leonid Parfionov, fired from the NTV back in 2004 (http://izvestia.ru/
news/290613), announced at a professional award ceremony in 2010 a crisis in 
Russian journalism (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9nvQhUBA0k). 
In 2014, infotainment on Russian TV is used solely as a means of boosting 
ratings and attracting viewers with the help of criminal or scandalous details. The 
modernization of social myths has ceased to be directed to improve the acceptance 
of liberal values and Western culture. The Russian information community is 
witnessing a crisis in dialogism, a return to monological propaganda methods. 
As it is a universal method of presenting information, infotainment 
is not likely to fully disappear from Russia, although it will be a different kind 
of infotainment. The period of desacralization of Soviet myths with its help, as 
described in this article, is apparently over. 
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